



16441

Nº 118

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM CIA/RR ER 66-1 RELEASE AS SANITIZED

January 1966

1998

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

M COMMUNIST CULTURAL AND PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Office of Research and Reports

Archives and

RETURN TO ARCHIVES & RECORDS CENTER SECRET Exclude. IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE

JOB 228 11 1/1 80X 5

WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defence of the United States within the meaning of the essionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

١,

S-E-C-R-E-T

FOREWORD

Soviet and Chinese Communist programs for cultural and propaganda activities in the less developed countries are discussed in this report, with major emphasis on the activities of the USSR. The programs of the Eastern European Communist countries (which are appreciable if taken as a group) and of the other Far Eastern Communist countries (which are the smallest programs and the most recently initiated) do not differ in approach from the Soviet and Chinese programs and are discussed only briefly. They are included, however, in the tabulations of total Communist cultural activity in the text and in Appendix A. Programs of Cuba and Yugoslavia are not included.

The term <u>Communist countries</u> as used in this report includes the USSR, the Eastern European Communist countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Remania), the Far Eastern Communist countries (Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam), and Albania and Mongolia. For purposes of this report, Albania is grouped with the Eastern European Communist countries and Mongolia with the Far Eastern Communist countries.

BLANK PAGE

S-F-0-R-E-T

CONTENTS

		Page
Summ	mary	1
I.	Introduction	3
	A. Communist Objectives in the Less Developed Countries	3
	B. Organization of Communist Foreign Cultural and Propaganda Activities	4
II.	Communist Cultural and Propaganda Activities in Less Developed Countries	7
	A. Cultural Agreements	7 9 10 15 17 19 20
	Communications Media	22
III. IV.	Cost of Communist Programs	25 25
	Appendixes	
App	pendix A. Tables	27
App	pendix B. Source References	37
	<u>Tables</u>	
1.	Number of Cultural Agreements and Protocols Signed by Communist Countries with Less Developed Countries, 1 January 1956 - 1 December 1965	7
2.	Communist Broadcasting to Less Developed Areas,	11

ay Turkyibt İ

ORCERT

		Page
3 •	US and Communist Broadcasting to Less Developed Areas,	11
4.	Periodicals Distributed by Communist Countries in Foreign Countries, 1961-64	16
5•	Number of Cultural Agreements and Protocols Signed Between Less Developed Countries and Communist Countries, 1964	29
6.	Less Developed Countries Having Friendship and Cultural Societies with Communist Countries, 1956-64	30
7.	Communist Broadcasting to Less Developed Areas, 1955-64	32
8.	Number of Books Published by the USSR in Languages Used in Less Developed Countries, 1964	33
9•	Communist Economic Aid to Less Developed Countries for Cultural and Information Facilities, January 1958 - December 1964	3 ¹ 4
10.	USIA and Communist Expenditures for Cultural and Propaganda Activities, 1964	36
	Illustrations	
Fig	for Communist Cultural and Propaganda Activities as of 1 December 1965 (map) following page	14
Fig	gure 2. Soviet Organization for Propaganda Activities Abroad (chart) following page	4
Fig	gure 3. Growth of Communist Broadcasting to Less Developed Areas, 1955-64 (chart) UNCLASSIFIED following page	10

S-E-C-K-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

COMMUNIST CULTURAL AND PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES*

Summary

Communist cultural and propaganda programs in the less developed countries have expanded greatly since the mid-1950's and now cost about US \$400 million a year. Enough successes have been achieved in these costly programs to suggest that they will be maintained and even expanded. Of the total cost of the Communist propaganda and cultural offensive, the USSR pays about one-half, the Eastern European Communist countries about one-quarter, and Communist China the bulk of the remainder.

In carrying out their cultural and propaganda activities in the less developed areas the Communist countries have

- (1) established sizable organizations to plan and operate their cultural and propaganda program abroad;
- (2) signed cultural agreements with 36 less developed countries and increased the number of agreements signed annually from 3 in 1956 to 79 in 1964;
- (3) established binational friendship societies and cultural centers in more than 40 less developed countries;
- (4) increased their radiobroadcasting to these countries from 550 hours per week in 1955 to 2,268 hours per week in 1964;

^{*} The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best judgment of this Office as of 15 January 1966.

S-E-C-R-E-T

- (5) published millions of copies of books and many periodicals for distribution in less developed countries;
- (6) maintained press representatives in more than50 less developed countries and signed more than 30 news agency agreements;
- (7) conducted film showings and exhibits and exchanged increasing numbers of delegations, performing groups, and athletic teams with the less developed countries; and
- (8) extended more than \$60 million in economic aid for information media and cultural facilities.

Formerly, the major targets were the Middle Eastern and Asian countries, but recently the most rapid growth in these activities has been in Africa. In Africa and Asia the programs probably will be maintained and expanded. In countries such as India, Mali, and Ghana, where the volume and range of activities already are substantial, Communist efforts will be to refine existing programs. In all less developed countries, however, the continuing competition between the USSR and Communist China for influence will exert an important impact on the volume and content of Communist cultural and propaganda programs.

I. Introduction

A. Communist Objectives in the Less Developed Countries

Since 1954 the Communist countries have undertaken ambitious programs to establish close relations with the less developed countries. (For a map showing the target countries and the general types of programs, see Figure 1.) They have extended about \$7 billion in economic credits and grants and more than \$4 billion in military assistance to these countries. 1/* In addition, trade and diplomatic relations between the two areas have grown substantially, and almost 50,000 persons from less developed countries have received academic, technical, or military training in Communist countries. Supplementing these programs has been a constant and sizable increase in Communist propaganda and cultural activities in the less developed countries.

The distinction between "cultural" and "propaganda" activities, in Soviet eyes, is at best tenuous. Communist foreign propaganda activities involve the manipulation of mass media to disseminate information and ideas designed to obtain the maximum possible support for Communist policies. For example, a list of these propaganda activities may include broadcasting, publishing, news agency activities, film showings, and exhibits. Communist cultural activities, in contrast, seek to depict Communist artistic and literary achievements and include the exchange of performing troupes and literary works.

In general, Communist cultural and propaganda programs are designed to establish and strengthen rapport with the people of the less developed countries. The Communist countries particularly seek to identify themselves with the political and economic aspirations and anti-Western prejudices of these countries. The Communists, however, also use their extensive propaganda apparatus to exploit dissatisfaction and to encourage the overthrow of unfriendly regimes. The choice of targets selected by the Communist countries depends upon the expected receptivity of a group, the type of available media most easily exploited by the Communists, and the importance of the target group. The illiterate and poor are rarely the target of Communist propaganda. They have the least access to propaganda media, exert little pressure on government policies, and usually are not a revolutionary force. Those groups typically targeted are youths and students, young government and military officials, leaders of trade unions, and employees of information media.

The impact of these programs has varied depending to a large extent upon the political orientation of the less developed country involved. In general, where the Communists already have developed

^{*} For serially numbered source references, see Appendix B.

close and extensive political and economic ties, the cultural and propaganda activities that have followed also have become widespread. In such situations, the Communist countries have been able to impress many people with their achievements and capabilities, to project an image of benevolence, and to disguise political indoctrination under a cultural cloak. Increased contacts with the Communist countries, even by less developed countries that are disinclined from the basic philosophy of Communism, may gradually lead to the acceptance of selected Communist methods and techniques on the assumption that they can aid in accelerating socioeconomic development.

Sino-Soviet competition has resulted in a rapid expansion of Soviet and Chinese Communist cultural and propaganda activities in the less developed areas. The impact of such programs, however, has been dulled by the destruction of the myth of Communist unity and by the efforts of the USSR and Communist China to weaken the influence of each other. The recent failure of China to enlist the support of less developed countries in its opposition to Soviet attendance at the abortive Afro-Asian Conference reflected Afro-Asian unwillingness to become embroiled in the Sino-Soviet quarrel.

B. Organization of Communist Foreign Cultural and Propaganda Activities


In the USSR, foreign propaganda and cultural activities are under the jurisdiction of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union -- CPSU. (See Figure 2.) The Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee determines the content of all cultural activities. Policy is executed on the official level by the Communist Party through the Council of Ministers, with the Ministry of Culture and the particular State Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations responsible for carrying out the specific programs. Other state committees and agencies participating in Soviet propaganda activities abroad are the Committee for Broadcasting and Television, the Committee for Publications, the Committee for Cinematography, and the Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS). In addition, the foreign missions of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Foreign Trade conduct varied propaganda activities along with their regular duties.

Propaganda activities also are carried out at a nonofficial level by "private" organizations, such as the Council of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the All-Union Central Trade Union Council, the Union of Writers, the Union of Journalists, and the Academy of Sciences. Other organizations involved in propaganda activities along with their more legitimate functions are the Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Intourist, the "Sputnik" International Youth Travel Bureau, and the Soviet news agency Novosti.

CONTIDENTIA

Dies.

Soviet Organzation for Propaganda Activities Abroad



CONFIDENTIAL CAROL 1

S-E-C-R-E-I

The Information Department of the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi, having approximately 125 Soviet and Indian employees, is one of the largest Soviet propaganda offices in the less developed countries. Its structure is duplicated -- although on a much smaller scale -- in many other less developed countries. The Department contains a press section of 25 to 30 employees which prints and distributes Soviet booklets, brochures, and daily news bulletins (News and Views from the Soviet Union) and places Soviet news releases and feature articles in Indian newspapers. In addition, the chief of the Department, with the assistance of a six-member editorial board and 10 Indian translators, directs the publication of a propaganda journal, Soviet Land. A section of 66 employees handles all administrative and housekeeping duties for the Department. 2/ In addition to the main office in New Delhi, the Department maintains smaller information service offices in other Indian cities.

Communist China also has an extensive organizational structure for propaganda and cultural activities abroad. The Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party directs all cultural, publishing, literary, and educational activities. On the government level, the Office of Culture and Education of the State Council coordinates the activities of the Ministries of Culture and Education, the New China News Agency (NCNA), and the Broadcasting Administration Bureau. The Staff Office for Foreign Affairs, officially listed as part of the State Council, is reported to be, in fact, a Communist Party organization that oversees all foreign relations, including political, economic, and cultural activities of the responsible government ministries. 3/

Under the Staff Office for Foreign Affairs, the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries is responsible for carrying out the cultural exchange program. The Commission has seven regional divisions, two of which were established in 1964 to handle the growing Chinese Communist activities in Africa and Latin America. A separate division is concerned with Chinese participation in international cultural conferences. In addition, there are three functional divisions: (1) a propaganda division with sections for translating Chinese materials, presenting exhibits, and distributing films and periodicals; (2) a foreign aid division to handle the construction of cultural facilities such as stadiums; and (3) a cadre division for recruitment, training, and assignment of personnel abroad. 4/

Organizational structure in the Eastern European Communist countries is similar to that of the USSR, with various ministries, committees, and agencies under the jurisdiction of their respective Communist Parties. They have their own news agencies (the Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency -- BTA), international broadcasting (Radio Prague), and "private" organizations (the German-African Society in East Germany).

Most of the Communist countries have set up area studies programs and special institutes to train specialists in the language, history, and culture of the less developed areas to which they eventually will be assigned. In 1960 the USSR reorganized its Institute of Oriental Studies, dating from Tsarist times, and established Asian and African Institutes under the Academy of Sciences to conduct research and train specialists in Afro-Asian affairs. A comparable organization was set up for Latin America early in 1962. In May 1965 the director of the African Institute emphasized the expansion of Soviet-African cultural cooperation by announcing the readiness of Soviet scholars to participate in a 10-year program for studying and popularizing African culture. 5/

Communist China established an Afro-Asian Society in 1962 to promote domestic scholarly research on African and Asian countries. China also is recruiting African nationals to serve as advisers for an African Institute in Peiping. 6/

II. Communist Cultural and Propaganda Activities in Less Developed Countries

A. Cultural Agreements

The signing of a cultural agreement often is the first important Communist step in establishing a presence in a less developed country. Since 1956, when three such agreements were concluded, 36 less developed countries have signed at least 165 separate cultural agreements with Communist countries. Of the 165 agreements, the USSR has accounted for 34, East European countries for 89, Communist China for 22, and other Far Eastern Communist countries for 20. In 1964, 79 agreements and protocols (the largest number concluded in a single year) were signed with 27 less developed countries (see Tables 1 and 5*). This trend continued in 1965, with 71 agreements signed as of 1 December. In every year since 1960, Communist agreements with African countries have accounted for one-half to two-thirds of the total number of agreements and protocols signed.

Table 1

Number of Cultural Agreements and Protocols

Signed by Communist Countries with Less Developed Countries

1 January 1956 - 1 December 1965

		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
Total	Africa	Latin America	Middle East	Asia
3 12 7 19 22 42 46 45	0 0 1 5 8 26 25 29	0 0 0 0 0. 3 1	3 9 3 11 5 4 10 8	0 3 3 3 9 9
79 71	39	0	19 17	14 15
	3 12 7 19 22 42 46 45	3 0 12 0 7 1 19 5 22 8 42 26 46 25 45 29 79 46	3 0 0 0 12 0 0 7 1 0 19 5 0 22 8 0. 42 26 3 46 25 1 45 29 0 79 46 0	3 0 0 3 12 0 0 9 7 1 0 3 19 5 0 11 22 8 0 5 42 26 3 4 46 25 1 10 45 29 0 8 79 46 0 19

Cultural agreements usually are phrased in broad terms and refer to planned exchanges by general categories of activities. The annual protocols, however, describe in greater detail the exchanges to be undertaken. Most cultural agreements provide for exchanges of delegations, performing troupes, exhibits, publications, films, and

^{*} For Tables 5 through 10, see Appendix A.

teachers and specialists in various fields. Many make available scholar-ships for study in Communist countries and call for cooperation in radio, television, and newspaper activities. The agreements and protocols are drawn up to give the appearance of full reciprocity and balanced exchanges. Protocols concerning financial arrangements for executing the exchanges are sometimes attached. Many agreements are signed for three-year or five-year periods, with protocols concluded periodically to determine the yearly implementation of exchanges.

The following two Nepalese agreements are typical of cultural agreements between Communist and less developed countries. One agreement between Nepal and the USSR calls for the exchange of delegations. publications, exhibits, films, and radio programs in accordance with an annual plan and "in keeping with the principles of sovereignty, equality, and noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries." 7/ The program for 1965 specified that Nepal would receive one stage ensemble, an exhibit of Soviet stamps, one lecturer, an exhibit of photography, and two radio experts; the USSR/would receive an 18-member cultural delegation, 25 Nepalese students, three literacy experts, and an exhibit of photography. 8/ The program also provided for the exchange of literature between universities of the two countries and the exchange of radio programs, musical recordings, and textbooks. A financial protocol arranged for the host country to bear the local maintenance costs of the visiting delegations and for the country sending the group to pay traveling expenses.

An agreement between Nepal and Communist China is similar. It calls for the two contracting parties "according to their needs and possibilities" to exchange delegations, lecturers, teachers, performers, publications, exhibits, films, and sports teams under the terms of annual programs. 9/ The 1965 protocol provided for Nepal to receive a 50-man song and dance group, a 3-man friendship delegation, a 2-man medical delegation, a 4-man delegation of journalists, a table-tennis coach for six months, five Chinese students under scholarship grants, and an exhibit of paintings. China was to receive a 50-man cultural delegation, a 4-man publicity and broadcasting delegation, a 2-man medical delegation, 2 scientists, a table-tennis team, 12 Nepalese students on scholarship, 7 Nepalese language experts, and an exhibition. 10/

In many cases, it has been difficult for less developed countries to finance their part of even small cultural exchange programs. As a consequence, many less developed countries have attempted to discourage the Communist participant from sending more cultural groups than they themselves can possibly send in return. In some instances, financial difficulties have compelled less developed countries to refuse proposed exchanges. During 1964, Indonesia refused to sign a cultural agreement with East Germany because, Indonesia claimed, it could not afford the travel expenses of students and trainees to East Germany as provided under the proposed agreement. 11/

Whereas the Communists increasingly have been successful in concluding cultural agreements with many less developed countries, some less developed countries have insisted on modifications of the basic agreements. In 1964, Nepal refused to sign 10-year agreements with the USSR and Communist China but accepted agreements that could be terminated upon notice. Jordan signed a cultural agreement -- its first with a Communist country -- with the USSR early in 1965 but reserved the right to reject any Soviet programs, films, or exhibits that it deems objectionable. 12/ Turkey excluded student exchanges from its 1964 agreement with the USSR. 13/ Subsequently, the Turkish legislature voted against the decree which would have implemented the agreement. 14/ The Latin American countries have rejected proposed agreements with Communist countries and carry on mainly privately sponsored ad hoc exchanges.

B. Friendship and Cultural Societies

Another Communist technique employed to develop closer relations with less developed countries is the establishment of binational friendship societies and cultural centers. Between 1957 and 1964, Communist countries established such organizations in more than 40 less developed countries (see Table 6). Many Communist countries maintain branches of these societies in different cities of a less developed country. These organizations are responsible for conducting many activities, including exhibits, language lessons, film presentations, distribution of propaganda materials, and sponsorship of travel to Communist countries. In countries where such organizations do not exist, the Communists occasionally establish public libraries or reading rooms in their embassies.

The annual expenditures of a friendship society may range from several thousand dollars to as much as a million dollars, depending on the scope of activities, the size of membership, and the priority ascribed by the Communists to the activities in the country concerned. Generally, the major outlays for establishing and expanding these societies are taken care of by the sponsoring Communist country. In 1964, when the Soviet-Indonesian Friendship Society was expanding its activities, the Soviet consulate reportedly contributed more than \$1.3 million to purchase a building with a theater and library. 15/

Some activities of firmly established societies may be self-financing and even yield revenue to support or expand other activities. Income may be earned from admission fees to exhibits and film showings, membership dues, entrance fees for language classes, sale of items such as books and records, and advertising subscriptions.

Even so, a major source of operating income for friendship societies is the subsidies provided by Communist countries. For example, the USSR reportedly has subsidized the Lanka-Soviet Friendship League in Ceylon since 1956 with annual donations ranging up to \$2,500. 16/Most of the League's expenditures in 1964 apparently were covered by

Soviet subsidies. According to its official statement of accounts, the League spent \$2,200 in 1964 for holding Russian-language classes, maintaining a library of 5,000 books, showing 600 films, and presenting 21 exhibits in Ceylon. 17/ About 80 percent of the League's total income came from donations, presumably Soviet, and most of the balance from subscriptions, entrance fees to language classes, and the sale of Russian textbooks. In addition to its cash subsidies, the USSR apparently donated items such as books, films, exhibit materials, and the services of a language instructor -- none of which were listed in the official statement of accounts.

To conceal their involvement in the activities of the friendship societies and to avoid official objections, the Communists frequently resort to indirect methods of financing these organizations. For several years, the Czechoslovak consul general in Bombay donated \$2,100 annually to the Indian-Czechoslovak Cultural Society under the cloak of anonymous donations from Indian businessmen. 18/ In 1964 the Indian-Soviet Cultural Society requested a donation of \$21,000 worth of records and stamps from the USSR to be sold in India to meet the current expenses of the Society. 19/ The USSR planned to augment the Society's 1964 fund drive -- with a goal of \$500,000 to \$1 million -- by sending a cultural troupe to India and donating the proceeds from its performances. 20/

Friendship societies have been most active in Latin America and in some of the Asian countries, particularly India and Indonesia. In addition to conducting their legitimate activities (exchange of delegations, film showings, exhibits, and language lessons), these organizations have been used successfully by the Communists as centers for distributing propaganda, meeting places for leftwingers, and channels for distributing funds. When the less developed country suspects such activities, a society may be accused of interference in domestic politics and closely watched, as was the Uganda-Soviet Friendship and Cultural Society in 1965, 21/ or even suspended, as was the Indian-Chinese Communist Friendship Society in 1962.

C. International Broadcasting

Since 1955 the number of hours of Communist broadcasting to the less developed countries has increased rapidly, from 550 hours per week in 1955 to 2,268 hours per week in 1964* (see Tables 2 and 7 and Figure 3). Soviet broadcasts to these countries have more than tripled, and transmissions from Communist China and the East European countries are about $4\frac{1}{2}$ times the 1955 level. Broadcasts from other Far Eastern Communist countries have increased to a level of more than 5 times that of 1955 but have been confined almost exclusively to the less developed countries in the Far East. This expansion continued in 1965, and hours of broadcasting totaled more than 2,400 per week at the end of June.

^{*} The data for broadcasting include only those broadcasts openly attributed to transmitters in Communist countries. They do not include clandestine transmissions.

Growth of Communist Broadcasting to Less Developed Areas 1955-64

Number of Hours per Week




Table 2

Communist Broadcasting to Less Developed Areas 1955-64

Hours per Week Middle East and Total Africa Latin America South Asia Far East 1,061 1,388 1,615 1,784 18 2,014 2,122 2,268 1,042

Since 1959, weekly transmissions to less developed areas have accounted for almost one-half of all Communist international broadcasting. In 1964, Soviet broadcasts alone were almost double the volume of output by the US Voice of America (VOA) to the same areas. Total Communist transmissions to the less developed countries were almost six times as large as VOA programs beamed to these countries (see Table 3).

Table 3

US and Communist Broadcasting to Less Developed Areas 1964

]	Hours per Week
	US (Voice of		Broadcasting
	America)	USSR	Total
Total	<u>383</u>	724	2 , 268
Africa Latin America Middle East and South Asia Far East	46 103 80 154	129 95 318 182	369 259 598 1,042

S-E-C-R-E-T

During 1964 the USSR accounted for 32 percent of total Communist broadcasts to less developed countries, Communist China for 29 percent, East European countries for 24 percent, and other Far Eastern Communist countries for 15 percent. About 46 percent of all weekly broadcasts were beamed to countries in the Far East, 26 percent to those in the Middle East and South Asia, 16 percent to Africa, and 12 percent to Latin America.

In addition to the growth in the number of hours broadcast by the Communist countries, there has been a substantial increase in the number of languages used. In February 1960, for example, Radio Moscow initiated its first regularly scheduled broadcasts in a native African language, with Swahili broadcasts to East Africa. In subsequent years the USSR initiated regular broadcasts in Amharic to Ethiopia, Hausa and Bambara to West Africa, Somali to East Africa, Lingala to the Congo, and Malagasy to Madagascar.

As of June 1965, Radio Moscow was transmitting international broadcasts in the following 34 languages spoken in less developed countries 22/:

Amharic	Indonesian	Pushtu
Arabic	Korean	Quechua
Bambara	Lao	Singhalese
Bengali	Lingala	Somali
Burmese	Macedonian	Spanish
Cambodian	Malayalam	Swahili
English	Malagasy	Tamil
French	Marathi	Thai
Greek	Nepali	Turkish
Hausa	Persian	Urdu
Hindi	Portuguese	Vietnamese
		Zulu

In addition, Soviet International Services in Baku, Dushambe, Yerevan, Kiev, Minsk, Riga, Tallinn, Vilnius, and Tashkent broadcast in Azerbaijani, Kurdish, Tadzhik, and Uzbek.

Radio Peiping's international broadcasts to less developed countries are transmitted in the following 19 languages 23/:

Arabic	Indonesian	Spanish
Burmese	Korean	Swahili
Cambodian	Lao	Tamil
English	Malay	Thai
French	Persian	Turkish
Hausa	Portuguese	Vietnamese
Hindi		

Communist international broadcasts to less developed countries usually include international and domestic news, commentary, and feature items -- all interspersed with music. Many stations broadcast a regular series for radio amateurs, special youth and women's programs, and interviews with political leaders, outstanding personalities in the arts and sciences, and foreign guests. Most prepare feature programs on art, music, literature, science, and sports to acquaint listeners with cultural life in the Communist countries. Special broadcasts commemorate national holidays in the receiving country or anniversaries of important events in Communist relations with the less developed country. Both Moscow and Peiping have used their broadcasts to peddle their own brands of socialism. Some of the Communist countries -- including Communist China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and the USSR -- now give language lessons by radio.

Soviet broadcasts to the less developed areas emphasize Soviet friendship and the desire for peace, disarmament, and coexistence. In addition, they stress the economic and cultural achievements of the USSR and the benefits of Soviet exchanges with the less developed countries. In contrast, Chinese Communist broadcasts are less restrained and even violent in opposing the United Nations, US policies, and Soviet friendship with the West. They stress the themes of Afro-Asian unity, militant friendship, anti-imperialism, and revolution.

The USSR continually tries to improve the content of its broadcasts to less developed areas and to relate them more effectively to specific target audiences. In June 1962 the Central Committee of the CPSU issued a decree urging "a sharp increase in the number of hours broadcast, the improvement of content, and strict differentiation of programs for the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America." The decree further stated:

Permanent programs for women, working youths, students, and other categories of foreign radio listeners [must] be organized in conformity with their interests and requirements.

In the preparation of broadcasts the wishes of foreign friends ... and observations and proposals by radio listeners [must] be attentively taken into account; wide use is to be made of letters from abroad, of impressions of members of foreign delegations about their stay in the Soviet Union, as well as of addresses of Soviet people who have visited other countries.* 24/

^{*} The decree also sought to increase the quality of broadcasting personnel supplied by the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee. Cadres were to be trained on a [footnote continued on p. 14]

Programs tailored for special audiences have become widespread since the 1962 decree. Radio Moscow, for example, broadcasts special programs to Algeria in French and Arabic about life in the USSR. Other special programs include "Soviet-African Friendship Calling the Peoples of Africa" to Africa, "The Radio Club of Soviet and Iranian Friends of Peaceful Coexistence" to Iran, and "The Soviet Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity Speaks" to Arab listeners.

In November 1964 the USSR initiated a new Spanish-language program especially for Latin America under the sponsorship of the Council of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. The program, identified as Radio Peace and Progress, is concerned with general international affairs and domestic activity in the USSR. In May 1965 the USSR added Portuguese transmissions of this program for Brazil.

Thus far, Communist China has made little effort to tailor programs to specific target audiences, and infrequent attempts to localize broadcasts have been relatively ineffective. Many Chinese broadcasts beamed to less developed areas consist of translations of Chinese domestic broadcasts. In Africa, where reception of Chinese broadcasts is extremely good and often more audible than local radio programs, Radio Peiping's programs have been criticized for their dull, repetitive content and their lack of subjects of interest to African audiences.

The Communist countries use various devices to attract a greater listening audience for their radio programs. Listeners' clubs are created for people who do not own radios. Broadcasting schedules are advertised in local newspapers, foreign language publications, and special program booklets and brochures. Radios Moscow, Peiping, Prague, Warsaw, and Bucharest carry advertisements in the annual World Radio-TV Handbook listing the types of programs and languages broadcast and inviting questions and comments. They answer correspondence, broadcast concerts on request, and send free souvenirs, magazines, and program schedules on request. To encourage more active response and regular listening, contests are often held with prizes of radios, cameras, or trips to the sponsoring countries.

The Communists also promote considerable travel of radio personnel, provide aid for the development of communications media, and sign radio and television cooperation agreements. Since 1961 such agreements have been signed with 11 less developed countries. In addition, cultural agreements concluded with the less developed countries may provide for exchanges of radio and television programs and personnel.

long-range basis at the universities while the Higher Party School of the CPSU Central Committee in Moscow was to train 30 to 35 radio and television editors per year. Local Party schools were to provide another 100 editors. Plans were also announced to enlist specialists with a good knowledge of foreign languages for permanent work in foreign broadcasting.

A more subtle and potentially important source of Communist influence over broadcasting by a less developed country is through news agency agreements. By offering inexpensive and sometimes free news services, the Communists often succeed in placing items in news bulletins of local radio stations and in this way reach a larger audience than through direct broadcasts from Moscow or Peiping. In April 1964, it was estimated that Communist countries were supplying 60 to 70 percent of all radio material used by the island of Zanzibar. 25/

The Communist countries also have been active in the field of television in the less developed countries. As early as 1960 the USSR conducted television activities in Guinea, Lebanon, and the UAR. These included efforts to place material on already established stations, the training of television employees, film and program exchange, and offers to help establish new television stations. Some of their more successful activities have involved Communist participation in or sponsorship of television festivals. Communist countries have participated in all annual International Television Festivals held in the UAR since 1962.

D. Books and Periodicals

The Communist countries publish a large variety of foreign language books and periodicals, many of which are destined for readers in the less developed countries. In 1964 the USSR alone published about 45 million copies of more than 1,500 books in about 40 non-Soviet languages. Of these, almost 28 million copies, consisting of more than 1,000 titles, were published in 24 languages spoken in less developed countries (see Table 8). By comparison, in 1954 the USSR published fewer than 13 million copies of 580 titles in eight languages spoken in less developed countries. Although the Communist countries distribute many books abroad that are published primarily for use at home, these countries also publish books solely for readers in the less developed countries. This special publishing effort includes the publication of limited editions intended for distribution in only one country -- for example, 10,000 copies of a volume of Malian President Keita's speeches were published in the USSR and presented to the government of Mali in mid-1965.

Distribution of books published by the Communist countries is carried out by various book export organizations; through bilateral book exchange programs with foreign libraries; and by clandestine methods. The latter include direct mailing to individuals, book stores, and organizations; transshipment through non-Communist publishing houses; and dissemination by local Communist Parties, trade unions, and embassies. Written propaganda is also distributed at international book exhibits, by friendship societies and Communist fronts, and through outright gifts to libraries and organizations.

In addition to donating books, the Communist countries export books and periodicals commercially. The value of Soviet exports of

printed material to less developed countries almost quadrupled between 1955 and 1963, rising from \$150,000 to \$588,000. Such material, however, frequently is sold by the Communists at prices that do not cover the cost of publication and distribution. Terms to local distributors generally are quite favorable. Books are obtained at substantial discounts with payment frequently made in local currency to the Communist embassy or consulate, often after the shipment has been sold. The transaction tends to be profitable for the local bookseller and involves no outlay of foreign exchange. A bookstore in Brazzaville, for example, received 1,500 French-language books from the USSR to be sold at prices that yielded profits of as much as 60 percent to the bookseller. Payment for the shipment was due 200 days after arrival, compared with the usual 90-day terms of French publishing houses. 26/

In addition to books, the Communist countries publish a large variety of periodicals. In 1964, more than 177 different periodicals were published in 35 languages for circulation outside the Communist countries (see Table 4). These included pictorials and magazines concerned with specific subjects, such as the activities of women, youth, student, and trade union organizations. Promotion techniques for periodicals include advertising through leaflets and brochures, publication of language lessons, and prize competitions.

Table 4 Periodicals Distributed by Communist Countries in Foreign Countries $\underline{a}/1961-64$

		······································		Number
	1961	1962	1963	1964
Total	126	172	174	177
USSR Communist China Albania Bulgaria Czechoslovakia East Germany Hungary Poland Rumania North Korea North Vietnam Mongolia	15 19 1 11 23 9 b/ 12 b/ 14 12 5 3	12 16 2 12 36 19 21 30 13 6 4	12 18 2 12 36 19 21 30 13 6 4	14 18 2 11 36 19 21 30 13 6 6

a. Excluding periodicals published in Communist countries by international front organizations.

b. Estimated.

On occasion, a specific event may produce a torrent of printed material. Chou En-lai's African tour early in 1964 was accompanied by thousands of copies of Chinese propaganda booklets on the Sino-Indian border dispute and China's friendship with the African people. More than 100,000 copies of Mao Tse-tung's works reportedly were sold in more than 30 African countries during 1963. In connection with Chinese participation in the Mexican Trade Fair held in 1964, the Chinese shipped tons of propaganda concerning life in China to Latin America.

The Communists have always assigned an important role to literature in the "anti-imperialist struggle." A Chinese delegate to the Afro-Asian Literature Forum held in Peiping in December 1964 pointed out that "writers must rally their forces, merge with the people in this life-and-death struggle, and write to inspire the people to advance and create a new, revolutionary literature for Asia and Africa." 27/ Chinese efforts to promote their own version of this thesis and the continuing expansion of Chinese propaganda activity in general have led to increased Sino-Soviet competition in the dissemination of printed material in the less developed countries. For example, in Mexico, a major distribution center for Communist literature throughout Latin America, the Chinese Communist Institute for Friendship with Latin America began in October 1964 an active campaign to counter pro-Soviet propaganda, especially that published by the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students. The Chinese issued a publication entitled "Bulletin of Chinese Youth" sponsored by the All-China Youth and Student Federations. 28/

Whereas many less developed countries permit a large volume of Communist literature, others forbid the importation and dissemination of any Communist publications. Where controls exist, the Communist countries usually develop clandestine channels of distribution. India and the Latin American countries are major targets for printed propaganda. In general, publications that are not blatantly propagandistic in content have been favorably received. Literature that is openly revolutionary and subversive, however, usually is subject to government confiscation. The new African nations have been particularly sensitive to any literature that might encourage subversion or revolution. Early in 1965, Nigeria banned the Peking Review after articles appeared advocating guerrilla warfare and revolution, and Tanzania banned nine Communist publications, including the World Marxist Review.

E. News Agencies

Communist countries maintain press representation in more than 50 less developed countries. The Soviet news agencies, TASS and Novosti, are represented in about 50 less developed countries. New China News Agency (NCNA) personnel are active in more than 30 countries. The news agencies of the Eastern European Communist countries also maintain foreign correspondents in some of the less developed countries.

Perhaps more important for the expansion of Communist influence is the conclusion of news agency agreements. By mid-1965, Communist news agencies had signed 31 such agreements with 16 less developed countries. These agreements provide for the exchange of news, features, and photographs; offer technical assistance for developing national news services; and often include the use of Communist news services and radio teletype equipment at minimal rates or sometimes free of charge. For example, in December 1962 a proposed three-year agreement between TASS and the Liberian Information Service provided for (1) Liberia to receive and distribute to its press and radio daily radioteletype news transmissions in English from Moscow at a cost to Liberia of \$2,000 annually; (2) Liberia to accept one permanent TASS representative and to supply him with free press bulletins for transmission to Moscow; and (3) TASS to furnish and install, free of charge, a set of receiving equipment in Liberia for the reception of TASS transmissions. 29/

In addition to its news reporting, TASS distributes information about the USSR, collects foreign news for Soviet domestic use, negotiates with foreign news agencies, subsidizes local newspapers, and provides free news services to newspapers unable to afford their own foreign correspondents. In February 1961, in an effort to overcome the "official character" of TASS and to compete with Western information agencies in the less developed countries, the USSR established the Novosti press agency. Novosti is described as a "public" organization, but its sponsors -- the Union of Journalists, the Union of Writers, the Council of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and the All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge -- are all organs through which the Communist Party exercises control. In 1962 Novosti sent 50,000 stories to 90 different countries and claimed publication in 2,000 foreign newspapers and magazines. In addition, it published 26 magazines, 5 newspapers, and 53 bulletins in overseas areas; distributed 387,000 photographs; and published 70 pamphlets for distribution in 60 foreign countries. Most material sent abroad is disseminated in the native language of the country concerned, and Novosti reportedly translates 500 pages of copy a day.

Communist China conducts activities in the less developed countries similar to those of TASS through the NCNA. In recent years, Africa has received increased attention. During 1965 China planned to expand the facilities of the NCNA in Africa with the opening of new offices in the Central African Republic, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia. The Chinese reportedly have divided Africa into zones under various NCNA officers in preparation for a propaganda campaign aimed mainly at the French-speaking countries and directed by Chinese officials in Paris. 30/ Communist China has actively supported a plan of the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association (AAJA) to train Afro-Asian journalists as revolutionaries, and an academy of journalism has been established by the AAJA in Peiping.

The Communist countries frequently subsidize local newspapers to ensure favorable placement of their news items. The USSR, however, has recently decreased its emphasis on outright subsidies in favor of rewarding cooperation by purchasing advertising space. In Senegal, the Soviet Embassy frequently purchases unattributed space in local publications -- sometimes as much as three or four pages at \$200 per page -- to present photographs of Soviet life.

Communist news agency activities in the less developed countries have had varied impact. Some Communist press correspondents, particularly those of the NCNA, have been accused of subversive activities. In July 1965, Kenya expelled the NCNA correspondent there "in the interests of national security." More recently the Malian Minister of Information praised the activities of the NCNA while criticizing the rigidity of Soviet and East European press services. 31/

F. Films and Exhibits

The Communist countries have made extensive use of films and exhibits in their propaganda campaigns in the less developed countries. Films generally are distributed by Communist diplomatic missions, cultural centers, and friendship societies. Admission during special film weeks and film festivals often is free, and films reach a wide audience. The Communist countries also distribute films commercially. Film exports through normal foreign trade channels, however, account for only a fraction of Communist film distribution in the less developed countries. Such exports from the USSR have even declined in recent years, dropping in value from about \$430,000 in 1960 to slightly more than \$300,000 in 1963.

International film festivals are particularly important media through which the Communist countries disseminate their propaganda and distribute their films. Communist countries generally are well represented at the major festivals and frequently win a large share of the awards. Although the films shown at festivals are usually free of overt propaganda, they present themes popular in the less developed countries and depict the achievements of Communist society. Communist film showings are frequent in Algeria, Somalia, and India, and theaters in Uruguay show many Soviet and East European films commercially. Reception is sometimes unfavorable. For example, Communist film weeks in Algeria, where Western films are preferred, have been disasters. 32/In the spring of 1965 the Ethiopian government restricted Soviet filmvan operations in the country following reports that the USSR was showing propaganda films and using the occasions to teach subversion. 33/

During 1964, Communist and less developed countries exchanged more than 200 exhibits, including participation in trade fairs. Africa and Asia each accounted for at least 80 exhibits. India alone hosted or sent more than 65. Exhibits often are conducted under the terms of cultural agreements either by friendship societies or through ad hoc



arrangements between governments or nonofficial organizations. The exhibits range in size from simple photographic or handicraft displays to large-scale commercial expositions involving the construction of special exhibit halls. In January 1964 the USSR and Communist China completed imposing pavilions in Mali and held rival trade expositions there. Such presentations serve to encourage trade with the Communist countries and to advertise the cultural and economic accomplishments of Communism.

G. Exchange Programs

The Communist countries promote extensively the exchange of delegations, performing groups, and sports teams in order to establish personal contacts with selected groups in the less developed countries. Because these contacts are easily adapted to all fields, they afford opportunities to establish friendly relations and gain influence. The annual cost of all Chinese and Soviet exchange programs is estimated as high as \$100 million, with the less developed countries accounting for a large share of the total.

During 1964, Communist and less developed countries exchanged a large number of delegations representing the fields of art, music, science, education, writing, and journalism and representing trade unions, youth organizations, and student organizations. At least 1,500 delegations (compared with about 800 during 1955) ranging in size from one or two members to large groups of 50 to 100 traveled between Communist and less developed countries during the year. India and Indonesia were the major less developed country participants, exchanging about 200 and 170 delegations, respectively. Among other important participants, Ghana and Algeria each accounted for 120 delegations, Mali for almost 90, and Guinea and Tanzania for about 60 each.

In 1964, Communist China and the less developed countries exchanged about 675 delegations, nearly half with African nations. These figures reflect an impressive growth in Peiping's use of exchange programs since 1961, when a total of 230 delegations traveled in both directions. During April and May 1965, China exchanged more than 70 delegations with African countries as part of a massive effort to win support for the abortive Afro-Asian Conference originally scheduled for June 1965 in Algiers. Peiping reportedly paid all the expenses of the delegations.

Visitors to Communist countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America generally receive red carpet treatment. The programs are well organized and often elicit favorable comment. Some visitors, however, have returned home with a distaste for conditions under the Communist system. For example, a former official at the Ghanaian Embassy in Moscow remarked that not one prominent Ghanaian visitor to the USSR during his two-year tour in Moscow was favorably impressed. 34/

S-E-C-R-E-T

Delegations to the USSR usually tour Moscow, Leningrad, and one or more cities of the Central Asian Republics. Kiev or the Caucasus region are sometimes included. Visitors are almost never taken to Moldavia, the Baltic States, and Karelia. During these tours, Soviet officials emphasize the theme of peaceful coexistence, present the USSR as a model society, express admiration for the national cultures and achievements of the visitors' countries, and seek to demonstrate the rapid advances of the Soviet Asiatic Republics under Communism.

Visitors to Communist China may visit nine "open" cities: Canton, Peiping, Tientsin, Wu-han, Nanking, Wu-hsi, Soochow, Hangchow, and Shanghai. In contrast to the Soviet theme of peaceful coexistence, the Chinese underscore the themes of militant friendship and common struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism. The Chinese generally make a more emotional appeal to visitors than do the Soviet officials by their enthusiastic welcoming of guests from less developed countries. Even visitors who are relatively low granking may be greeted by crowds of thousands and be received by top Chinese leaders.

During 1964, Peiping was involved in numerous high-level exchanges, including a three-month tour of 10 African and 3 Asian nations by Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi and visits to China by Indonesian President Sukarno, Princes Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong of Laos, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, King Zahir of Afghanistan, Kenya's Oginga Odinga, Sudan's General Abbud, Vice President Kawawa of Tanzania, Prince Abdallah of Morocco, President Massamba-Debat of Congo (Brazza-ville), Malian President Modibo Keita, and President al-Sallal of Yemen.

At least 120 performing groups (compared with 30 in 1961) were exchanged between Communist and less developed countries during 1964, about half involving African countries. The USSR accounted for more than 35 percent of all such exchanges and Communist China for about 25 percent. Although many of the less developed countries have called for more balanced cultural exchange programs, less than one-fifth of the performing groups were visitors to Communist countries.

As might be expected of any program, performances by Communist entertainment troupes in the less developed countries have had varied success. A Soviet dance troupe in Jordan, the first Soviet cultural attraction to appear in that country, was unimpressive. Attendance for two performances in Amman totaled approximately 3,500, but only, after the Soviet Embassy distributed a large number of complimentary tickets. 35/ A Soviet cultural group in Dahomey was termed an "organizational disaster," 36/ and a Soviet vaudeville troupe that performed at Hodeida, San'a, and Ta'izz in Yemen was not too successful. The troupe suffered even more in comparison with the success of the Chinese Communist Shenyang Acrobatic Troupe performing in Yemen. The Chinese performances were timed to coincide with the anniversary of the Yemen revolution and the announcement of new Chinese economic aid to Yemen. A Chinese acrobatic team that performed in Dahomey in April 1965 was

a rousing success, but one Dahomean newspaper criticized Communist China for attempting to woo Dahomeans with entertainment rather than technical assistance. 37/

The dearth of cultural attractions in many less developed countries makes Communist presentations welcome. The holding of such presentations only in the major cities, however, has severely limited their impact on the general population.

Figures concerning the cost of Communist entertainment troupes are not available. Some idea of the magnitude of such costs, however, may be obtained from outlays connected with US cultural presentations in less developed countries. Between 1954 and 1963 the cost of such undertakings to the Department of State ranged from \$350 for single entertainers to as high as \$30,000 for orchestras and groups. Although the Communist countries have sponsored many presentations in the less developed countries free of charge or for nominal admission, they have also tried to conduct presentations strictly on a business basis. The Soviet Armenian folk dance group that performed in Lebanon late in 1964 received a fixed sum from the Lebanese booking firm as well as transportation, lodging, and an allowance per diem of \$3.25 for each member of the 65-man group. During the first half of 1965 the Colombia Artist Management, Inc., refused to sponsor a tour by the Soviet Osipova Balalaika Orchestra because Soviet terms with overhead and other charges totaling \$5,000 per performance would not make the tour a profitable venture.

During 1964 the Communist and less developed countries exchanged at least 100 athletic teams or training groups, 40 percent of which involved African countries. Sports exchange programs may be quite sizable. For example, a 1964 sports exchange agreement between Indonesia and Communist China provided for eight Indonesian teams to travel to China (these included waterpolo, badminton, table tennis, archery, gymnastics, fencing, and wrestling) and eight similar Chinese teams to Indonesia. In addition, nine coaches from Communist countries were in Indonesia during the year to instruct in various sports.

$\frac{\text{Economic and Technical Assistance for Local Communications}}{\text{Media}}$

As part of their cultural and propaganda activities in the less developed countries, the Communist countries have extended economic and technical assistance to a number of countries for the development of local information and cultural media. Between 1954 and the end of 1965, Communist economic credits and grants for broadcasting and printing facilities, for news agency services, and for the construction of theaters, conference halls, and sports stadiums totaled more than \$60 million.* Such aid represents less than 1 percent of all Communist assistance

^{*} For a compilation of the types of aid provided, see Table 9.

extended to the less developed countries. Included in this assistance is the provision of material and equipment for project construction, the services of Communist technicians to supervise construction, and the training of native technicians to operate the completed facilities.

Communist assistance also consists of scholarships for technical courses in Communist countries, such as a three-month news agency course, a six-month television production seminar, an eightmonth printing course, or a journalism program of five years. African trainees in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and the USSR have constituted the largest share of such trainees. As with all training in Communist countries, people from the less developed countries who are being trained in communications media are often subjected to ideological indoctrination. Some of these trainees have come under Communist influence. Such individuals are in a unique position to spread the Communist line, particularly in countries where they are the only trained personnel in their fields.

In addition to economic aid for local media, the Communist countries have donated printing and broadcasting equipment, newsprint, films and projectors, and sports equipment to cultural and information ministries, educational institutions, and private cultural and political groups in the less developed countries. Such gifts, however, may come with conditions. There is an unconfirmed report that Soviet printing machinery intended for the publication of two daily newspapers by the Pan African Press which arrived in Kenya in the summer of 1965 was kept on the docks pending Kenyan acceptance of the condition that the Press would not accept any Chinese Communist material. 38/

BLANK PAGE

III. Cost of Communist Programs

Total expenditures of the Communist countries for their foreign cultural and propaganda operations are not known. The costs of such activities are not indicated in the budgets of these countries but are probably subsumed under the large amounts allocated for social, cultural, and educational programs. (In 1964, the USSR allocated \$36.8 billion for social-cultural measures.) Communist expenditures for some activities in individual countries have been reported. These costs, however, represent only small items in the total cultural and propaganda programs of the Communist countries.

Worldwide Communist cultural and propaganda activities involve outlays as high as \$2 billion annually and employ a half million people. In contrast, the authorized expenditures of USIA for fiscal year 1964 totaled less than \$140 million, and the number of people employed by USIA during the year was less than 11,000. In the less developed areas the volume of Communist activities far surpasses comparable USIA activities. It would cost the United States a minimum of about \$400 million to duplicate the cultural and propaganda activities carried out by the Communist countries in the less developed countries during 1964.* Of this total, the USSR accounts for about one-half, the East European countries for about one-quarter, and Communist China for the bulk of the remainder.

IV. Prospects

In general, Communist propaganda and cultural programs have been successful in enhancing the Communist image in the less developed countries and probably will continue to expand in the next few years. Efforts to maximize the impact of these programs are likely to include attempts to generate more audience interest, to introduce more subtlety in propaganda themes, and to tailor such programs toward specific target countries or groups within countries. In certain countries -- for example, in India, Mali, and Ghana -- the volume and variety of activities already is considerable. In these countries, continuing successes will depend largely upon further refinement of existing programs.

Activities will probably expand most rapidly in Africa, with particular emphasis on person-to-person exchanges and activities in the field of local communications media. Activities in Asia and the Middle East will expand more gradually. In Latin America, written propaganda, trade fairs, and commercially profitable performances and film showings will remain important. Communist efforts to conclude cultural agreements with Latin American countries, however, will remain largely unfulfilled. India will continue to be the primary Soviet target, and Communist China will continue its attempts to increase its prestige among its less developed Asian neighbors. Sino-Soviet competition will continue to influence heavily the volume and content of Communist cultural and propaganda activities in all less developed countries.

^{*} For a breakdown of these costs, see Table 10.

BLANK PAGE

C F C R B-I

APPENDIX A

TABLES

BLANK PAGE

T-0-V-F-T

Table 5

Number of Cultural Agreements and Protocols Signed Between Less Developed Countries and Communist Countries 1964

USSR	12	킈	۲ ,	+⊓пппппппппппппппппппппппппппппппппппп	д дд д	91	ਰ ਰਗਰਕਰ
Rumania	⊅	⊲I	ч	ન બા	т г		
Poland	#t	M	ч	ч ч		નI	H
North Vietnam	cu ll			αI	п п		
North Korea	ω 1	ا⊄	- 1	н нн — М	п пп	ᆌ	٦
Mongolia	ପ∥	α !		ল ন ≸			
Hungary	91	4 1	ч	<i>)</i> ਰਿਹ ਰ ਦੀ	٦	႕	٦
East Germany	91	1 t-		d dd d		વા	т т
Czecho- slovakia		91	7	नित त त ता	ч		
Communist China	1	7		ਜਿਰਜ ਜਰ ਜ ਅ	п пп	ᆌ	ret
Bulgaria	9	ณไ	٦,	۲ ما -	н н	٥I	н н
Albania	OII	리	٦	٦١	ч		
Total	79	외	∞ -	אמציוססומטומט אַ ר	ら今でてれて	77	001510101
	Total	Africa	Algeria Burundi	Central African Republic Congo (Brazzaville) Dahomey Ethiopia Ghana Guinea Kenya Mali Niger Senegal Somalia Tanzania African East	Iraq Syria Turkey United Arab Republic Yemen	Asia	Afghanistan Cambodia Ceylon India Indonesia Nepal Pakistan

Table 6

Less Developed Countries Having Friendship and Cultural Societies with Communist Countries 1956-64

	USSR	0	1960	1956	1961	N.A. 1959	1959 1959 1964 1960		1957	1957 1957 1960	1957	1957		1960	1960 1957 1957	1964
	Rumania								1957	1960	1957	1962			1962 1957	1957
	Poland	;	N. A.		1962		N.A.		1957	1957 1957	1957	1957			1957	1957
	North Vietnam	,								1962						
	North Korea									1962						
hed	Mongolia						,									
Established	Hungary					N.A.	<i>,1</i> ;			1957	1960	1957			1960 1957	1960
Year	East Germany		N.A.		1963	1967	\			1963 1962	1960	1957			1960	N.A.
	Czecho- slovakia		N.A.		1963	1961			1962	1957	1957	1957			1960	1960
	Communist China			N.A.	1961	1959	1959		1957	1957 1957 1957	1963	1960 1960 1960		1962	1960 1960	1957 1960
	Bulgaria		N.A.			1962	N.A.		1957	1957 1957	1960	1960			1960 1957	
	Albania	-							1957	1960					1960 <u>a</u> /	
		Africa	Algeria. Cameroon	Ghana. Malagasy	Mali Nigeria Socool	Somalia Sudan Tongonio	Tenzanta. Togo Tunisia Uganda Upper Volta	Latin America	Argentina.	Bolivia Brazil Chile	Colombia Honduras Mexico	Peru Uruguay Venezuela	Middle East	Cyprus Greece	Iran Iraq Israel	Leoanon Syria United Arab Republic

Table 6 (Continued)

			-	S=	
	USSR		1960 1957	1957 1957 1957	1957 1957
	Rumania			1961 1960 1961	
	Poland			1962 1957	1959
	North Vietnam		1961	1961 N.A.	1963
	North Korea			1961 1957 1961	1957
shed	Mongolia			1957	1962
Year Established	Hungary			1958 1961	1960
Year	East			1961 1962 1961	1961
	Czecho- slovakia			1962 1957 1957	1960 1957
	Communist China		1963 1957 1961	1957 1957 b/ 1957	1956 1957
	lbania Bulgaria			1957 1961	1961
	Albania		1961		
		Asia	Afghanistan Burma Cambodia	Ceylon India Indonesia	Laos Nepal Pakistan

a. Dissolved in 1962. b. Suspended in 1962.

Communist Broadcasting to Less Developed Areas 1955-64

	1								Hours pe	per Week
	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
Total	250	899	9886	1,061	1,388	1,615	1,784	2,014	2,122	2,268
USSR Communist China Eastern European Communist countries $\underline{a}/$ Communist Far East $\underline{b}/$	226 142 117 65	241 211 128 88	296 259 214 117	332 352 218 159	420 400 355 213	442 516 394 263	506 566 471 241	653 590 485 286	664 649 522 287	724 666 531 347
Africa		വ	മി	77	51	77	500	295	329	369
USSR Communist China Eastern European Communist countries $\underline{a}/$ Communist Far East $\underline{b}/$		m	m	14	31 44 6	42 35 20	73 63 64	112 56 127	126 63 140	129 66 167
Latin America	51	72	95	104	138	167	218	279	252	259
USSR Communist China Eastern European Communist countries $\underline{a}/$ Communist Far East $\underline{b}/$	21	58 74	35	38 174 52	\$ 45 51 68 68	56 31 80	63 38 117	120 38 121	81 38 126 7	95 38 119
Middle East and South Asia	222	238	370	412	563	623	633	242	578	598
USSR Communist China Eastern European Communist countries $\underline{a}/$ Communist Far East $\underline{b}/$	135	147 7 84	189 34 147	215 34 163	261 42 260	265 70 288	293 63 277	281 63 203	298 70 210	318 63 203 14
Far East	277	355	418	531	929	728	733	893	963	7,042
USSR Communist China Eastern European Communist countries $\underline{a}/$ Communist Far East $\underline{b}/$	70 142 65	66 201 88	215 215 14 111	65 304 159	323 213 213	79 380 6 263	77 402 13 241	140 433 34 286	159 478 46 280	182 499 319

a. Including Albania. b. Including Mongolia.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Table 8

agilyapun nan ma

Number of Books Published by the USSR in Languages Used in Less Developed Countries 1964

Participation Participati												By Subjec	By Subject Matter						
title Cooleration Title		More Fifty	By Number than Pages	of Page Fewe:	r than Pages	Works Founde Marxism-	by the rrs of Leninism	Works Ab Founde Marxism-	oout the ers of Leninism	Intern Affi Foreign	ational airs, n Policy	Educ: Phild Lingui	ation, ology, istics	Belle	tristic rature	Child	dren's rature	Unspec	ified
Hand black Han	Language	Titles	Thousand	Titles	Thousand	Titles	Thousand	Titles	Thousand	Titles	Thousand	Titles	Thousand Copies	Titles	Thousand	Titles	Thousand	Titles	Thousand
1	Total	873	548,45	154	2,886	78	752	27	319	63	392	398	19,795	88	728	27	787	316	4,584
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Afghan	7	ű,									7	5						
c. 144 194 194 10 4 15	Amharic	5	13	9	15											9	1.5	űλ	13
3 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	Arabic	44	194	10	£.	9	20	61	ī	m	-7	~	요* - 국	검	55	i)	-17	23	18
ss	ıgəli	1.5	7.8	<i>#</i>	e:		56	-ï	ĵ,					~~7		٠,	30		21
sh 427 19/122 97 1,613 21 241 17 1995 21 27 1995 21 27 1995 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 22	Surmese	7	īν				\$					\$	£3						
h 53 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	dish	427	10,522	50	1,613	23	71/Z		105	12	2777	360	17,304	돲	60 11	y	22.1	150	2,811
1 15/7 2,510 15 17 14 115 115 7 56 13 144 140 2,102 11 85 5 69 7 7 7 7 14 116 120 13 14 140 140 2,102 11 8 7 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9	<u>-</u> 5		5.5	-	-				<u>-</u>			۲.	~		2.				Т
1 3 1 3 1 4 5 1 5	nch	List	2,810	97	1.2.14	74	118	7	2	13	144	TOO	2,102	13.	85	5	49	69	739
Signosis Sa	7	m									-	ω							
sh 12 120 13 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 2 1 1 3 2 1 1 3 2 1 1 3 2 1 1 3 2 1 1 3 3 3 4 2 1 1 3 4 2 2 1 3 2 1 3 3 3 4 2 4 2 6 2 2 6 2 2 6 2 2 6 4 1 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 <td>di</td> <td>23</td> <td>239</td> <td><i>i</i>~</td> <td>97</td> <td>တ</td> <td>37</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>7</td> <td>132</td> <td>٣</td> <td>1.7</td> <td>_7</td> <td>53</td> <td>3</td> <td>4.5</td> <td>5</td> <td>63</td>	di	23	239	<i>i</i> ~	97	တ	37			7	132	٣	1.7	_7	53	3	4.5	5	63
sh 12 120 12	onesian	12	97									50	16						
sh 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 17 4 26 2 1 3 ann 5 36 3 31 4 6 7 17 1 3 guesse 2 36 3 1 6 1 6 2 26 2 26 2 26 2 26 2 26 2 26 2 26 2 26 2 26 2 26 41 1 2 1 2 4 13 3 11 3 str 7 1 2 1 2 4 13 3 1 3 2 2 th 6 4 1 2 4 1 3 4 27 1 th 6 4 1 2 4 1 3 4 27 1	ean	15	120											10	66			ત્ય	2.1
hi 4 23 1 6 7 1 5 1 5 1 6 7 1 5 1 6 7 1 7 1 3 1 2 8 2 4 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 4 3 3 3	dish	٣	c)	ч	ਜ.									m	СI	ч	н		
an 5 36 3 31	athi	<i>:</i> ‡	23	Н	m	-	9					m	17			٦	m		
sh 75 175 175 175 177 177 177 177 177 177	sian	Ŋ	36	m	31									- #	56	נט	56	α	15
si	tuguese	C)	ω									ત	8						
sii 75 1,511 21 273 16 282 5 121 10 160 12 284 11 154 4 86 41 6 41 86 41 3 41 86 41 3 11 3 11 3 11 3 2 Nu 6 23 3 22 2 9 1 2 1 3 4 27 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 27 1 6 mms se 16 90 5 70 1 3 2 4 15 1 1 1	ghalese	٦	9	7	175											7.	175	Ţ	9
11 7 26 5 14	mish	3/2	1,511	21	273	97	282	5	121	10	160	12	284	11	154	<i>.</i> ‡	æ	41	269
10 69 1 25 1 6 41 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 4 27 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 27 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	hili	7	56	5	14					7	cu	н	5	_	13	m	11	٣	σ
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	i1	10	69	7	25	rH	9			9	41					8	35	8	15
3 3 3 3 6 and see 16 90 5 70 1 3 2 4 55 11	ກສີກ	9	23	m	55	ď	σ	7	ณ					٦	m	~†	27	٦	- 1
3 7 2 16 1 1 1 1 2 2 6 1 15 1 enne se 16 90 5 70 1 3 2 4 1 1 1 0 4 55 11	, −1	m	٣									m	m						
16 90 5 70 1 3 2 3 2 4 1 10 4 55 11	n	m	7	ત્ય	16	ч	-1	Н	Н					(V	v	H	15		
	tnamese	76	8	5	70	~	3	cu	m	C/I	<i>2</i> ‡			- 1	01	77	55	11	85

Table 9

Communist Economic Aid to Less Developed Countries for Cultural and Information Facilities January 1958 - December 1964

Donor	Recipient	Date	Item	Cost (Million US \$)	Status a/
Total				62.0	
USSR	Guinea	August 1959	Sports stadium Radio station, two 50-kilowatt	ы с О	ບ ບ
	Kenya.	November 1964	Radio station	N.A.	, LI
	Mali Somalia	March 1961 June 1961	Stadium Printing plant	9.0)
			50-kilowatt transmitter Five mobile movie theaters	l.o N.A.	ບ ບ
	Afghanistan	October 1961	Motion picture studio	N.A.	1
	Indonesia	June 1959	Sports stadium 50-kilowatt transmitter	 	വ വ
	Laos	March 1959	Radio facility	1.6	Ü
	; ; ;		Radio station	5.6	Ö
			Radio monitoring station	4.0	Ö
			Technical assistance in broad-	- 1	į
			casting and television	7.0	O
			center and broadcasting house	N.A.	Ö
			Television tower plans	N.A.	
	United Arab Republic	January 1958	Two radio stations	0.0	U
	.		Radio parts plant	5.0	ర
Communist China	Guinea	September 1960	Public address systems	N.A.	į
		,	National theater and assembly hall	N.A.	8
	Mali	September 1961	Cinema mrostor	N.A.	v.
	SomeLla	August 1903 Tung 1064	ineacer 100-kilowatt transmitter	2.0	ω
	I alizalita Cevlon	October 1962	International conference hall	3.6	on On
	Indonesia	December 1964	Radio transmitting stations	N.A.	
Bulgaria.	Ghana Tunisia	October 1961 February 1963	Stadium National sports center	N.A. 1.5	ပဏ

a. C (completed), UC (under construction), S (under survey), and CS (construction suspended).

Donor	Recipient	Date	Item	Cost (Million US \$)	Status a/
Czechoslovakia	Algeria Guinea Mali	May 1964 July 1959 June 1961	Radio transmitters Radio equipment for embassies Radio equipment National Information Agency	3.4 0.3 1.6 N.A.	8 D D D
East Germany	Ghana Guinea Mali Tanzania Indonesia Syria United Arab Republic	May 1961 July 1960 April 1961 May 1964 January-June 1964 September 1964 August 1958	Printing plant equipment Radio sound studio and theater Public address system Printing press Photographic laboratory Printing equipment Broadcasting center Television assembly plant equipment Modernization of film studio		0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poland	Guinea	1960	Cinema service	0.5	Ü

USIA and Communist Expenditures for Cultural and Propaganda Activities

Thousand US

/q	391,020	60,610 84,880 11,110 2,410 82,380 16,550 79,380
Estimated Costs of Communist Activities in the Less Developed Countries $c/$	Total	Information offices Books and periodicals Films Binational cultural organizations Broadcasting Exhibits $\underline{d}/$ Exchange programs $\underline{d}/$ Administrative and other related expenses
3 <u>a</u>	138,866	54,439 11,149 7,560 6,110 26,777 4,580 28,251
es for All Areas 1964		l,819 1,819 497 2,234 upport 8,001 s 15,100
USIA Authorized Expenditures fo	Total	Overseas missions Press and publications Motion picture service Information centers Broadcasting Television Administrative and other related expenses Research and reference Cooperative programs Program direction Administration and staff support 8,001 Personnel to other agencies Administrative support 15,100

b. In general, costs of Communist activities were estimated by (1) deriving an average cost per unit from appropriate US cost data, (2) checking the validity of such costs against available information on actual Communist expenditures, and (3) multiplying the average cost per unit by the total number of units. A percentage for The subtotals and the grand total thus obtained were checked against available rough estimates from other sources administrative and other related expenses in total expenditures, derived from USIA budget information, was added. a. Authorized expenditures for all countries, including the less developed countries. and seem to be reasonably valid.

⁽³⁾ participation in international film festivals; and (4) gifts of broadcasting, printing, and motion picture Excluding the cost of (1) books and periodicals published abroad; (2) news agency and press activities;

APPENDIX B

SOURCE REFERENCES

1. General

Information in Tables 1 and 5 was obtained from general file materials including many FBIS items and State airgrams, none classified higher than CONFIDENTIAL.

Tables 2 and 7 and Figure 2 were derived from the following unclassified USIA publications: Twelve Years of Communist Broadcasting, 1948-1959, by Simon Costikyan; R-7-61, Developments in Communist Bloc International Broadcasting in 1960, 10 February 1961; R-44-61, Developments in Communist Bloc International Broadcasting in the First Half of 1961, 25 August 1961; R-32-63, Developments in Communist Bloc International Broadcasting in 1962, 11 March 1963; R-13-64, Developments in International Broadcasting by Communist Countries in 1963, March 1964; and R-18-65, Developments in International Broadcasting by Communist Countries in 1964, February 1965.

Information on VOA broadcasting in Table 3 was found in <u>Hearings</u> of the Congress of the United States on appropriations for the Department of State, Justice, and Commerce; the Judiciary; and related agencies for 1965.

Sources for Table 4 are the following unclassified USIA publications: Research note 7-62, Sino-Soviet Bloc Periodicals Published in Free World Languages, 1961, 21 March 1962; R-4-63, Sino-Soviet Bloc Periodicals Published in Free World Languages, 1962, 31 January 1963; R-67, Selected Communist Foreign Language Periodicals, 1963, 25 May 1964; R-15, Periodicals Exported by Communist Countries in 1964, February 1965.

Table 6 was derived from the USIA publication series on Communist cultural and propaganda activities in specified less developed areas and from general file materials.

Table 8 was taken from R-38-65, Soviet Book Publishing for Export, 1964, 2 April 1965, UNCLASSIFIED, and Table 9 from EIC R14, S19, Aid and Trade Activities of Communist Countries in Less Developed Areas of the Free World, 1 January - 30 June 1965, August 1965, SECRET/

Information on the USIA budget in Table 10 was taken from USIA, 21st Review of Operations, 1 July - 31 December 1963, UNCLASSIFIED.

Figure 1 is from NIS-26, Section 58, Propaganda, February 1961, p. 58-19, CONFIDENTIAL, updated from general file materials.

2. Specific

```
EIC. EIC R14-S19, Aid and Trade Activities of Communist Coun-
      tries in Less Developed Areas of the Free World, 1 January -
      30 June 1965, Aug 65. S/N
     CIA.
           CS, 25 Nov 64. S/Nr
           CS, 24 Jun 65. S/N° **
     CIA.
     CIA.
           CS, 10 Jul 64. C/r
     CIA.
           FDD 6590, 1 Jul 65.
           CS, 6 Nov 64. S/"
     State, Katmandu. Airgram A-09, 8 Jul 64. U.
 7.
 8.
     Tbid., A-329, 25 Jun 65. U.
     Tbid., A-103, 26 Oct 64. U.
 9.
10.
     <u>Ibid.</u>, A-76, 16 Sep 65. U.
     CIA. CS, 2 Mar 64. C.
11.
12.
          CS, 21 Apr 65. S/N/.
     CIA.
13.
     CIA.
           CS, 13 Nov 64. C/
     FBIS. Daily Report (Middle East, Africa and West Europe),
      21 Jun 65. OFF USE.
15.
     CIA.
           CS, 29 Jan 65.
                           S.
16.
           CS, 30 Nov 61.
     CIA.
                           C/N:
     CIA.
           CS, 21 Feb 63.
                           C/NC
17.
     CIA.
           CS, 17 Jun 65.
                           C/Mr
18.
           CS, 11 Jun 62.
     CIA.
                           S/NC
19.
           CS, 26 Mar 63.
     CIA.
                           C/NC
20.
     CIA.
           CS, 27 Oct 64.
                           S/NE
21.
22.
     FBIS. Guide to Languages Used in International Broadcasting,
      15 Jul 65. OFF USE.
23.
     Tbid.
24.
     State, Munich. Airgram A-142, encl, 24 Sep 63. U.
25.
26.
     USIA, Brazzaville. USIS 17, 30 Apr 65. OFF USE.
27.
     China Reconstructs, Apr 65, p. 26-27. U.
28.
           CS, 3 Feb 65. C.
           CS, 12 Feb 65. C.
     CIA.
29.
           CS, 2 Jan 63. C.
     CIA.
30.
     CIA.
           CS, 23 Mar 65. S/M
31.
     African Review, Nov 65, p. 21-22. U.
32.
33.
    W
     St ···
34.
35.
     State, Amman. Airgram A-145, 16 Sep 64. OFF USE.
36.
     USIA, Contonou. Telegram, 7 Dec 64. OFF USE.
    State, Contonou. Airgram A-57, 28 Sep 65. U.
37.
     CIA. CS, 19 Jul 65. C/N
```